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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw -LEGISLATIVE CoNT.SMPT PoWER- PROCEDURE 
AGAINST WrrNESs FOR CoNDuCT BEFORE CoMMISSION COMPOSED oF LEGIS-
LATORS AND OT.HERS-The Massachusetts General Court,1 for the purpose of 
1 The Massachusetts legislature is so designated. 
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investigating communism and subversive activities within the Commonwealth, 
established by joint resolution a "special commission" composed of two members 
of the Senate, three members of the House, and two persons to be appointed 
by the governor. 2 When the commission summoned Otis A. Hood3 to appear 
before it, he refused to be sworn as a witness without first receiving witness fees, 
and llippantly expressed his demand for payment.4 The general court requested 
an advisory opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, propound-
ing three questions: (I) whether the special commission was a committee of the 
legislature so that contempt before it constituted contempt of the general court 
within the meaning of specified articles of the Massachusetts Constitution;5 
(2) whether the general court could adjudicate in contempt and punish a person 
guilty of disrespectful behavior before such a commission; and (3) whether, if 
there were such a power, a hearing before the bar of the general court was 
required before commitment. Held: "No" to questions 1 and 2, and question 3 
consequently inapplicable. Because a committee composed of legislators and 
others is not a working part of the House, contemptuous behavior before such 
a commission cannot be said to be directed against the House as a whole, and 
therefore is not subject to the legislative contempt power. Opinion of the Jus-
tices, (Mass. 1954) 119 N.E. (2d) 385. 
The constitutional provision that in certain specified instances of contemptu-
ous conduct the general court may punish by imprisonment should not mean 
that other acts equally obstructive or disrespectful cannot be found contemptu-
ous. Indeed, the court conceded that contumacy before a committee composed 
entirely of legislators, although not occurring in the presence of the House and 
not otherwise within the constitutional provision, does constitute contempt of 
• the appointing body. But the court believed that this is true only because of 
the identity of such a committee as a working part of the House.6 Therefore, 
the court reasoned, if a committee is diluted with non-legislators, this identity 
2 Mass. Acts and Resolves (1953), Resolves, c. 89. 
3 Hood, the ex-state leader of the Communist party in Massachusetts, was subsequently 
indicted under a 1951 Massachusetts act [Mass. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1954) c. 264, §19] 
outlawing membership in subversive organizations. N.Y. T1MEs, April 9, 1954, p. 16:5. 
4 Hood's remarks: " 'I think it would be preferable if you pay the fee as you are 
supposed to. • . • You are a,sking for eighteen thousand dollars for more funds. What are 
you doing with it, padding your expense accounts? • • . I will not take the oath without 
the money. Why don't some of you loan it out of your pocket? You have plenty .•• .'" 
Principal case at 385. 
0 "The house of representatives . . • shall have authority to punish by imprisonment, 
every person, not a member, who shall be guilty of disrespect to the house, by any dis-
orderly, or contemptuous behavior, in its presence; or who .•• shall threaten harm to the 
body or estate of any of its members . . • or who shall assault, or arrest, any witness, or 
other person, ordered to attend the house . . . or who shall rescue any person arrested by 
the order of the house .••• 
"The senate shall have the same powers .•.• Provided that no imprisonment on the 
warrant or order of the • • . senate, or house of representatives • • • be for a term exceeding 
thirty days.'' MAss. CoNsT., Part II, c. 1, §3, arts. X and XI. 
6 For this proposition the court cites McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 at 156, 47 
S.Ct. 319 (1927), where, however, language emphasizing the fact that all committee mem-
bers were senators was directed to the speci£c issue of whether the oath of legislative office 
would suffice as a warrant of the committee report. 
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is lost, and disrespect before it ceases to be an affront to the legislature. How-
ever, the reason generally given for exercising the contempt power is that a 
legislature must be able to deal directly with obstructions to its legitimate func-
tions.7 This suggests that the proper inquiry in determining if conduct before 
a committee constitutes contempt of the appointing body should be whether 
the legislative process has been impaired. If it is found that certain conduct not 
included within the constitutional provision nevertheless is obstructive of legis-
lative functions, while the legislature may not be authorized to proceed against 
it by summary imprisonment, it does not follow that all power to deal directly 
with the offender is precluded. For instance, if the legislature could authorize 
the commission to summon witnesses, it certainly could require one who refused 
to testify before the commission to appear before the House and there to account 
for his noncompliance.8 If before the open session the witness should fail to 
justify his conduct and persist in his refusal to testify, this would constitute a 
separate act of contempt, 9 for which the legislature could punish by imprison-
ment.10 This analysis would avoid the mechanical limitation imposed upon 
the legislative contempt power in the principal case. Yet it would not result in 
an unconstitutional or improvident extension of the power to imprison for con-
tempts, because only those persons would be affected who, by remaining non-
compliant or disrespectful when called before the House, would bring upon 
themselves the full consequences of contemptuous conduct in its presence. 
Julius B. Poppinga 
7 Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 37 S.Ct. 448 (1917). See generally: Potts, 
''Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt,'' 74 Umv. PA. L. REv. 691 (1926); 
Herwitz and Mulligan, "The Legislative Investigating Committee,'' 33 CoL. L. REv. l 
(1933); Driver, "Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Punish Con-
tempts of Its Investigating Committees,'' 38 VA. L. REv. 887, 1011 (1952). Federal and 
state cases are collected in 50 A.L.R. 21 (1927) and 65 A.L.R. 1518 (1930). 
s The power to so proceed against a recusant committee witness was upheld in Burn-
ham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray (80 Mass.) 226 (1859), and also upheld under similar consti-
tutional language in Lowe v. Summers, 60 Mo. App. 637 (1897). That such an appearance 
is a required step in direct contempt proceedings for conduct before federal legislative com-
mittees, see EBERLING, CoNGRESSlONAL lNvEsTIGATIONS 179 (1928). In 1857, Congress by 
statute made contempt of the legislature or its committees a misdemeanor subject to prose-
cution in federal courts. 11 Stat. L. 155 (1857), as amended by 52 Stat. L. 942 (1938), 2 
u.s.c. (1952) §192. 
9 Lowe v. Summers, note 8 supra. 
10 Burnham v. Morrissey, note 8 supra. 
